CHAPTER 7
A WHOLE LOT OF SUBSTANCE
OR A WHOLE LOT OF RHETORIC?
A PERSPECTIVE ON A
WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH
TO SECURITY CHALLENGES
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
The Department [of Defense] supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to addressing
national security challenges. The desired end state
is for u.s. Government national security partners to
develop plans and conduct operations from a shared
perspective.
Quadrennial Defense Roles
and Missions Review Report, 2009 1

INTRODUCTION

In the U.S. Government, the "whole of government" mantra is firmly embedded in official rhetoric
as the idea-du-jour. Moreover, as the quote above indicates, in the national security realm particularly, it is
officially considered a bedrock principle.
Indeed, the Obama administration - building on
themes developed previously by the Bush and Clinton
administrations2 -explicitly incorporates a whole of
government (WoG) approach in the National Security
Strategy issued in May of 2010. 3 In the administration's
conceptualization, a WoG approach in the national security sphere essentially involves, among other things,
greater coordination across government agencies, and
a marked expansion of diplomatic and civilian devel185

opment capabilities. Military and civilian institutions
are, the strategy insists, to "complement each other
and operate seamlessly."4
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly trace the
application of the WoG approach to security issues,
highlight a few of its strengths and weaknesses, and
examine the potential unintended consequences. It
will argue that while a WoG approach certainly has its
merits, it is not-and never will be-a panacea. Moreover, this chapter contends that in some instances a
unilateral approach, that is, one that wholly or primarily relies upon a particular agency, is the preferred
or only practical alternative. The chapter will also
suggest that when extended to the domestic context,
a WoG approach strategy may be unsettling, and even
counterproductive, to the Nation's long-term strategic
and political interests.
Finally, this chapter advocates considering a WoG
approach as just one tool in the smart power toolbox.
It argues that as such, a WoG approach is most effective when selectively employed, and not as a default
in all circumstances.
IRREGULAR WAR AND THE RISE OF THE WoG
APPROACH

As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently observed, for "well over a decade, there has
been Widespread concern that the U.S. government
lacks appropriate civilian 'tools' to carry out statebuilding tasks in post conflict situations."5 Operations
in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere were cited
as examples of situations where it fell to America's
armed forces to perform a variety of state-building
tasks" such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance."6
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The February 2011 report points out:
The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match
the military's superior planning and organizational
capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the
military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and
nation-building contribution, even though some believed
that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks,
especially those tasks involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]?

Still, the current impetus for a WoG approach is
much traceable to reconstruction and stability issues
arising out of the irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defined by the Pentagon as a "violent struggle
among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and
influence over the relevant population(s),"8 irregular war was exactly what the Department of Defense
(DoD) found itself fighting after toppling the Baathist
government of Iraq, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
The DoD may have anticipated security issues, but
it seems clear that it nevertheless expected that once
the conventional fight ended, the task of physically reconstructing the country and rebuilding its economic
societal institutions - essential elements of strategic
victory in irregular war - would be the responsibility
of other government agencies and the international
community.
Things, however, did not work out that way. According to analyst Gordon Adams, although "whole of
government" was among the "buzz words" that arose
in direct response to the post-major combat operations
stage in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD found itself:
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frustrated by the absence of a significant, flexible,
well-funded civilian capacity at the State Department
and USAID [U.s. Agency for International Development], able to take responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization after U.S. combat operations concluded. 9

That, it seems, was enough for the DoD to take matters into its own hands.
DoD authorities responded by attempting a rather
significant re-orientation of the armed forces to fill the
perceived post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization capability gap. In late-2005, the DoD issued a directive entitled Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR).lO Designed to
support President Bush's National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44,l1 this watershed policy document (designated Department of Defense Directive
[DoDD] 3000.05) declared that stability operations are
a " core U.s. military mission" and one that, according
to the directive, was to be given a priority comparable to combat operations."12
That document was followed in 2008 by the Army's
own Stability Operations manual which implemented
the DoD policy.13 The Army's manual contained an
explicit definition of the WoG approach, describing it
rather amorphously as an approach that integrates
the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the u.s. government to achieve unity of effort
toward a shared goal."14
In accord with DoDD 3000.05, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Revie'w (QDR) did not use WoG approach
terminology, but said as much in declaring that:
II
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The Department of Defense cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.s. Government to bring to
bear all elements of national power at home and to
work in close cooperation with allies and partners
abroad. 15

These sentiments were echoed in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Roles and Missions Review ReportJ6 wherein
the DoD affirms its support for the "maturation of
whole-of-government approaches to national security
problems," adding that any solution such an approach
produces will "be based on employing integrated flexible/ mutually-supporting interagency capabilities."l?
For its part, the 2010 QDR is replete with specific references to the WoG approach. 18
In the meantime, however, the Army and the Marine Corps also issued their counterinsurgency (COIN)
doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ which became the
"bible" for operations in Iraq and later Afghanistan. 19
A multifaceted document subject to a myriad of interpretations/ it was popularly imagined as a kinder,
gentler way of achieving success in COIN situations
by eschewing violence against insurgents in favor of a
population-centric strategy aimed at winning "hearts
and minds/" much through nation-building and reconstruction efforts. Journalist Steve CoIl described it
thusly in the New Yorker:
[Popular] among sections of the country's liberalminded intelligentsia. This was warfare for northeastern graduate students-complex, blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than destroy
them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a
doctrine with particular appeal to people who would
never own a gun. 20
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It is also a doctrine that, on the face of it, is perfectly

suited to a WoG approach. In fact, it devotes an entire
chapter to integrating civilian and military e££orts. 21
Nevertheless, the doctrine makes it clear that nationbuilding tasks are essential for COIN success and, if
necessary, the military must endeavor to accomplish
them even in the absence of civilian partners. That circumstance occurred. For example, commanders were
obliged to turn to their "in-house counsel" (uniformed
military lawyers called Judge Advocates or "JAGs")
for even such activities as rule of law reconstitutiona task that would appear to be better conducted by
civilian personne1. 22
Unsurprisingly, therefore, when DoDD 3000.05
was re-issued in 2009, the DoD acknowledged the importance of civilian partners, but reiterated that the
DoD must be prepared to take the "lead" in such activities as establishing civil security and civil control,
restoring essential services, repairing, and protecting
critical infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian
assistance until it is feasible for another agency to take
over. 23
THE MERITS OF A WoG APPROACH

Taken at face value, the notion of exploiting all the
government's potential in the service of national security is eminently reasonable and wise. Plainly, national defense is the most basic rationale for government.
Our own Constitution cites" provide for the common
defence" as one of the key responsibilities of government. 24 Accordingly, the judicious bringing to bear of
government's full range of capabilities is consistent
with the fundamentals of good government and wise
defense policy.

190

Perhaps most important- but not often discussed-are the merits of the military not doing
many of the nation-building and reconstruction tasks.
Among other things, if not engaged in nation-building, the military could concentrate on its institutional
responsibility for national defense, particularly with
respect to existential threats which nation-building
and reconstruction do not address. 25
After all, the role of the armed forces is, as the Supreme Court put it, to fight or be ready to fight wars
should the occasion arise."26 Moreover, the Court
points out that [t]o the extent that those responsible
for performance of this primary function are diverted
from it ... the basic fighting purpose of armies is not
served."27 Therefore, when the armed forces divert
resources and-of even greater concern-focus, to the
conduct of operations not intrinsic to warfighting,
their ability to conduct bona fide combat operations
inevitably degrades.
There are, however, other important factors favoring a WoG approach. As talented as military personnel are, it seems obvious that the more facets of
the u.s. Government that can be brought to bear, the
more likely there will be an injection of an authentic
expertise when the task is not a traditionally military one. On the other hand, while the armed forces
may have manpower and resources to address many
nation-building tasks, that does not necessarily mean
that they possess the range and depth of experience
required to solve the convoluted problems arising in
civil society.
As just one example, consider that the military is
instinctively authoritarian and, as the Supreme Court
has drily observed," the army is not a deliberative
body," rather it is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." How could such
II
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an organization have the experience and mindset to
establish courts and legislatures where the essence of
their function is deliberation?
In addition, there is another important consideration, which is the psychological impact on the host
nation of a foreign military leading these efforts.
Many in America's military seem blissfully unaware
of the image they may unintentionally present when
they serve as the "face" of the United States in nationbuilding endeavors. One can only imagine what the
residents of a failed nation think when they see people
in uniforms - not civilian officials - as the ones who
are the main representatives of the United States in
the reestablishment of their society's institutions, to
include those expected to exercise civilian control of
the armed forces.2 8 Regrettably, the population may
assume, for example, that it is military direction (as
opposed to civilian leadership) that leads to success
in the modern world. This could have unwanted political consequences over time if the electorate comes
to perceive the armed forces as preferable to civilian
leadership.
Closer to home, there are other benefits to removing the armed forces from the conduct of nation-building activities not directly involving physical security
or military operations against insurgents. Specifically,
the long-term involvement in such activities in Iraq
and Afghanistan may be causing a subtle but troubling
change in the perspective of members of America's
armed forces. In 2006, historian Douglas Porch-citing the work of British historian Hew Strachan- made
this melancholy observation:
Politicians who engage in nation building endeavors,
especially those with a counterinsurgency dimen-
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sion must be prepared to deal with the political and
military professional fallout. This includes the evolution of a stab-in-the-back as a guiding principle of
civil-military relations and its leaching into domestic
politics - that is, the belief that, in modern counterinsurgency warfare, win or lose, the military ends up
feeling betrayed by the civilians. 29

We may be beginning to see this phenomenon,
much because of the way operations have been conducted in current wars. As this writer has observed
elsewhere:
Given responsibility not only for security, but also for
governance, education, and economic development
in wide swaths of territory in Iraq and Afghanistan,
a generation of US officers has become accustomed to
being warrior kings'. 30
f

As such, there is a real risk that even after their nationbuilding duties in contingency areas end, military officers may want to arrogate to themselves decisionmaking that democracies leave to civilians.
A disturbing manifestation of what might be an
emerging mindset is found in an October 2010 article
written by Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Andrew
Milburn that was published in the prestigious military
journal, Joint Force Quarterly.31 Milburn made the unprecedented argument that military officers have the
obligation to disobey even lawful orders if they subjectively decide that such orders are "likely to harm
the institution writ large- the Nation, military, and
subordinates - in a manner not clearly outweighed by
its likely benefits." 32 While the notion of disobedience
of lawful orders is an anathema to most officers, it is
nevertheless true, as journalist David Wood observes,
that many uniformed officers today are chafing for a
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"bigger role in [the] policy decisions" that historically
have been the province of civilian decisionmakers. 33
Importantly for a WoG approach analysis, Wood
maintains that the" current unrest among midcareer
officers is new" and reasons that:
today's majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels grew
up in counterinsurgency warfare, leading men into
combat as young platoon leaders and having to create
new ways of operating in dangerously complex political and social environments never imagined by their
elders. 34

As such, it may be that traditional- and critical- concepts of appropriate civil-military relations are under
stress at least to some degree because of the nationbuilding tasks which military officers have had to perform in the absence of civilian capability that a WoG
approach might otherwise provide.
In short, a WoG approach that displaces reliance
upon the armed forces as the principle agent of nationbuilding and post-conflict reconstitution may well
serve the interests of the targeted nation by better portraying the role of civilians in a democracy, serve the
interests of the U.s. armed forces by allowing greater
focus on its quintessential warfighting responsibilities,
and also serve American society itself by ameliorating burgeoning civil-military tensions. Nevertheless,
implementing a WoG approach effectively involves
substantial challenges.
WoG APPROACH CHALLENGES

Although Congress has grappled with the idea
of building civilian capability for nation-building
for most of the decade, numerous difficulties still ex-
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ist to implementing a WoG approach - not the least
of which are inadequate resourcing and authority.35
In 2004 the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created within the
State Department with a mission statement that would
seem ideally suited to relieving the military of much
of its current responsibility. S/CRS is supposed to:
lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.s. Government
civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict
situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can
reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy,
and a market economy.36

The centerpiece of the S/CRS effort is the Civilian
Response Corps (CRC). Drawing experts from eight
Federal departments or agencies, the CRC is a group
of civilian federal employees who are specially trained
and equipped to deploy rapidly to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance to countries in crisis
or emerging from conflict." 37 Although Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton applauds the fact that in just 2
years the ranks have grown to over 1,000 civilian responders, the reality is that only 250-300 can deploy at
any given time. 38
It is difficult to understand how such a relatively
small group - not much larger than a couple of companies of soldiers - could possibly obviate the need
for substantial military involvement to accomplish the
same tasks. After all, Iraq39 and Afghanistan40 are both
nations of more than 29,000,000 people. Even with reserves - which Congress has not funded - the whole
CRC was never contemplated to number more than a
few thousand persons.
/I
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According to the S/CRS/ many analysts have expressed doubt about S/CRS ability and capacity to
carry out its mission."41 Some of that doubt is blamed
on a perceived lack of funding by Congress/" but
there are also misgivings about an anti-operational
social culture in the State Department."42 There seems
to be real difficulty with a program that depends upon
large numbers of highly-expert civilians voluntarily
agreeing to serve in austere and dangerous circumstances. This appears to be an impediment, with troubling and perhaps intractable implications for future
operations.
As evidence of this issue, consider a 2007 New York
Times article reporting that many diplomats and Foreign Service employees of the State Department refused assignments to Iraq.43 Steve Kashkett, vice president of the American Foreign Service Association/
insisted that" there remain legitimate questions about
the ability of unarmed civilian diplomats to carry out
a reconstruction and democracy-building mission in
the middle of an active war zone."44
As a result, the Times says that those employees
who did agree to deploy IItended to be younger, more
entry-level types, and not experienced, seasoned diplomats."45 The former head of S/CRS recognizes the
problem and admitted in a March 2010 interview that
lithe State Department must shed the frisk-averse culture' it adopted in the mid-1980s."46 He added/ IIObviously, you cannot ignore risk, but we need to be willing to manage risk rather than simply avoid it."47
Other government employees seem to carry a rather robustly different sense of entitlement when serving in war zones, and this can complicate a WoG approach. For example/ a 2008 audit found that Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents were improperly
II
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paid millions of dollars in overtime while on 90 days
of temporary duty in Iraq.48 This investigation found
that the agents billed the government on average
$45,000 overtime pay, often for simply watching movies, exercising, or even attending parties. 49
Civilians clearly want to be well paid if they work
in dangerous areas. Journalist Nathan Hodge writes
that when anthropologists, hired to conduct analysis
of the "human terrain" in Iraq and Afghanistan, were
converted from "well-compensated contractor status"
to government employee status, "around a third of the
program's deployed workforce quit."50
Besides manning issues, recent reports from Afghanistan about program execution are not encouraging. 51 Critics insist that SICRS remains poorly funded
and is often ignored. 52 Consequently, reporter Spencer
Ackerman says that in Afghanistan"American diplomacy and development work in conflict areas remains
largely a military job."53 He says that u.s. soldiersnot American civilians -" politic with local potentates
on reconstruction projects."54 Thinking beyond the
specific difficulties with SICRS, the issue may become
this: Can a WoG approach work at all in the U.S. Government?
Analyst Todd Moss has his doubts. The former
State Department official acknowledges that a WoG
approach may work in other nations, but has reservations about its prospects in the United States. Moss
says:
in the United States-with its sprawling federal structure and huge agency staffs and budget-just getting
everyone around one table is perhaps too much to ask.
The interagency process in any country is a strain.
[Managing those tensions is actually what policymaking is all about.] Yet the process can become convolut-
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ed and bogged down when the scale is out of whack.
Simply put: when you have too many people at the
table, nothing gets done. 55

It may be that a WoG approach can suffer from

a form of the same malady as that which debilitated
American corporations late in the last century, that
is, over-diversification. Many companies acquired
widely-diverse businesses and put them under the
umbrella of a single conglomerate, apparently thinking that the mutual support of the whole would be
stronger and more profitable than the individual
parts. One can readily see how such thinking would
resonate with WoG approach goals. Unfortunately I it
often does not work.
Notwithstanding what might be called a IIwhole
of business'l approachl the Economist observes that the
idea "went out of fashion in the 1980s and 1990s ...
when companies began to see again the virtues of
sticking to their knitting' ."56 Sometimesl it seems, a
single-focused entity is better at a specific task than an
assemblage of actors with assorted backgrounds. Conglomerates that did succeed were ones that expanded
but did not stray far from their core competencies. The
chief executive of Bombardier, a Canadian manufacturing firm that acquired new businesses, did so by
ensuring that each new sector we entered shares certain fundamental similarities. 1I57
This may mean that a WoG approach may need
modification, or at least clarification. Not every security issue needs-or profits from-the application of
all the tools in the proverbial toolbox. In some circumstances l a WoG approach may be exactly the wrong
strategy; not every agency has the requisite core competencies to add value to the resolution of a particuI
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lar national security issue. If it is necessary to have a
bumper sticker for such a more nuanced approach,
then smart power may be it.
THE BETTER CONCEPTUALIZATION FOR THE
WAY AHEAD?

Secretary Clinton's articulation of smart power
shows it is related tOt but not exactly coterminous with,
a WaG approach. Although she does not claim to have
invented the smart power term, in her 2009 confirmation testimony she defined it as using the "range of
tools at our disposal- diplomatic, economic, military,
political, legal, and cultural'/ to address international
issues. 58 It does not seek to bring every tool to bear in
every instance; rather, smart power is about "picking
the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.// 59 Importantly, Clinton says that under a smart
power approach, "diplomacy will be the vanguard of
foreign policy.//60
Ta be sure, Clinton is not foreswearing a WaG
approach; however, she does seem to conceive it differently than has previously been the case. Writing in
the November/December 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs,
Secretary Clinton elaborated on her smart power concept and its distinct emphasis on civilian power: 61
By drawing on the pool of talent that already exists in
U.s. federal agencies and at overseas posts, the United
States can build a global civilian service of the same
caliber and flexibility as the U.s. military.62

In addition to its civilian focus, there is much about
the particulars of smart power worth noting carefully.
As already observed, it recognizes that sometimes
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"picking the right tool" suffices. If the number of participants can be minimized! the hazards of navigating
the interagency coordination process that concerned
Mr. Moss might diminish. 63 Moreover, it suggests that
there can be affirmative benefits of discrete approaches by separate government agencies. Consider the U.s.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) experience.
AFRICOM might be considered one of the most
aggressive models of at least a modified form of a WoG
approach. Established in 2007! it represents an innovative effort by the DoD to address the varied needs of
a multifaceted continent. 6-± It sees itself as a "different
kind of command" because it is fashioned with a:
much more integrated staff structure ... that includes
significant management and staff representation by
the Department of State, u.s. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and other u.s. government
agencies involved in Africa. 65

One of the most unique aspects of AFRICOM is its
leadership arrangements. Unlike any other military
organization, it designates a State Department ambassador as its "co-equal" deputy.66 Notwithstanding the
language of co-equality, AFRICOM makes it clear that
the ambassador!s military counterpart-a Navy admiral-exercises command authority in the AFRICOM
commander's absence only because "U.s. law does
not allow a State Department official to hold military
command authority."67 Despite the absence of legal
authority to command, AFRICOM says the" co-equal"
State Department official nevertheless" directs" a variety of military activities! including disaster relief and,
somewhat mysteriously, "security sector reform."68
The precise distinction between a civilian with authority to "direct" and a military officer empowered
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to "command" is unexplained and puzzling. While no
one questions the value of close working relationships
with the Department of State, there is a point at which
the intermingling in pursuit of an undifferentiated
WoG approach becomes an unproductive infatuation
that could dangerously confuse the military chain of
command in a crisis. Even more importantly, it may
send the wrong message about our diplomats around
the globe whose legal status and safety depends upon
the perception and reality that they are noncombatant
civilians apart from our military forces.
According to a 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, various stakeholders
raised similar issues. They were concerned that AFRICOM"could blur traditional boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense." 69 Likewise, the
S/CRS reports "mixed feelings" among many about
AFRICOM:
While many at the State Department and USAID welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to
organize complex operations, there also is concern
that the military may overestimate its capabilities as
well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are
not a core part of its mandate.7°

Both the GAO and the S/CRS also report concerns
that the size of the DoD could dominate U.s. activities and relationships in Africa" to the detriment of
foreign policy.71 Essentially, the apprehension was
that the command might unproductively "militarize
diplomacy and development" on the continent. 72 In
response, AFRICOM emphasized a WoG approachwith some success. 73 A subsequent GAO report
showed AFRICOM made progress, but effective collaboration remains a daunting issue despite the reII

201

markable integration of representatives of some 27
agencies. 74
The best intentions can, nevertheless, create issues.
For example, apparently AFRICOM originally saw
as part of its mission the task to "improve accountable governance" of African states. 75 Exactly what that
was supposed to mean remains unclear, but when
the most fearsome military in the world starts talking
about "improving" what it may decide is a sovereign
nation's accountability, it is no wonder that the command has yet to find a horne in any country on the
continent. The notion of Americans" improving" governments via a military command is an understandably alarming concept to many nations, especially in
the shadow of U.s. "regime change" operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
No doubt it is a worthy aim of the United States
to assist nations with bettering their govermnents, but
this is a classic example of an area where America's
armed forces ought to steer clear, and a WoG approach is affirmatively counterproductive. Africa has
an unfortunate history of militaries "improving" governments by crushing the existing ones in the name
of reform. AFRICOM certainly would not do so, but
the juxtaposition of an intent to "improve accountable
governance" with a military command invites untoward perceptions. Such a task may be appropriate for
diplomats and civilian agencies to facilitate, in concert
with other nations, international bodies, and NGOs,
but not our military.
Clearly, the case for a U.s. military command focused on Africa is a good one, but trying to mix the
armed forces and all it implies with activities better
carried out via a distinctly diplomatic or civilian entity is obviously problematic. In this instance it ap-
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pears that smart power must suggest a disaggregation
of the respective functions that might better serve u.s.
interests than the present WoG approach formulation.
Mating a military entity with a diplomatic function
could too readily serve to create unnecessary suspicions about u.s. intentions.
AFRICOM is not, however, the only example of
questionable utilization of WoG approach-style thinking (if not precise application of WoG approach terminology). Specifically, recent domestic counterterrorism
efforts have employed a WoG approach. Despite what
Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith calls"strong
sub-constitutional norms against military involvement in homeland security," 76 the powerful technical
surveillance capabilities of the DoD National Security
Agency (NSA) have increasingly been brought to bear
domestically to ferret out terrorism threats, as well as
to address growing risks to cyber security.
Unfortunately, to the extent a WoG approach involves the military in domestic security activities, history does not provide much encouragement. In the
1960s, for example, military intelligence officers, in the
name of national security, were enlisted to collect personal information on tens of thousands of Americans
who, in reality, "posed no real threat to national security ." 77 The military deployed - domestically _"more
than 1,500 plainclothes agents to watch demonstrators,
infiltrate organizations, and circulate blacklists." 78 As
a result of the ensuing furor, congressional oversight
increased,79 and legislation such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted. 80
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of September 11,
2001 (9/11), NSA capabilities were used for domestic
surveillance in contravention to FISA requirements.
When this illegal activity was revealed, the NSA was
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sued successfully, and on December 2010 was ordered
to pay $2.5 million in attorney fees and damages. 81 Despite this experience, the NSA recently signed a firstof-its kind WoG approach-style agreement with the
Department of Homeland Security to collaborate in
protecting civilian infrastructure from cyber attacks.
82 Although steps are being taken to protect privacy,
civil liberty advocates remain skeptica1. 83
All this is important because if such domestic
WoG approaches to security strategies involving the
military go awry, they could put in jeopardy vital government interests. The U.S. armed forces are an allvolunteer force (AVF) depending upon the affection
and respect of the American people to ensure that sufficient high-quality recruits choose uniformed service.
Currently, the military enjoys extremely high levels
of public confidence84 and respect,85 and that contributes immeasurably to the military's ability to sustain
itself.86
If that confidence and respect is compromised by
perceptions about illegal military involvement in activities that implicate civil liberties, the consequences
for the AVF may be serious. Too many potential recruits may not want to involve themselves in a military organization that may appear to be improperly
infringing upon the rights of citizens. Thus, as efficient
as a WoG approach may be in this arena, on balance it
may nevertheless be prudent as a matter of policy to
develop the necessary capabilities fully independent
of the armed forces.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

To be sure, a WoG approach should certainly be
considered in devising solutions to the complex secu-
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rity challenges of the 21st century. Yet it is those very
complexities that counsel against the undifferentiated
application of the concept. Clearly, the WoG approach
should not devolve into an insistence - or assumption-that every entity of government has some role
to play in every national security issue. As discussed,
there are real merits in keeping certain activities separate and, in any event, some activities are inappropriate assignments for the armed forces. Hence, in smart
power terms, a WoG approach is just an option among
several, and one that may - or may not - be appropriate for a given situation.
Although it is largely beyond the scope of this
chapter, some mention should be made as to the effectiveness of a WoG approach in its most common
and controversial application in the national security
arena: post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. It
is an article of faith among purveyors of contemporary COIN theory that such WoG approach-oriented
activities are indispensible to a population-centric
strategy.87 That strategy, encompassed in FM 3-24,88
aims to win the loyalty of the populace to the central
government the counterinsurgents are supporting by
facilitating that government's nation-building programs.
Bernard Finel, a Senior Fellow and Director of Research at the American Security Project, points out
that critics argue that a:
population-centric COIN [strategy] requires building
responsive governmental structures, promoting economic growth, and eliminating endemic corruptionobjectives that have almost never been successfully
accomplished in the long, doleful history of international development. 89
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Increasingly, experts like Finel argue that an enemycentric approach is more effective and better suited to
American interests. It unapologetically aims to neutralize the insurgents directly as a means to force" a
negotiated solution" - a result Finel argues is "consistent with the vast majority of conflicts in history."9o
In an interview coinciding with the release of
his new book, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the
Way Out of Afghanistan, former DoD official-turnedembedded-writer Bing West offers an unvarnished
assessment. Asked about the effectiveness of billions
spent on reconstruction, West says:
From [Afghan President] Karzai to the villagers, the
response has been rational: take or steal every dollar
the Americans are foolish enough to give away. In the
US, the Great Society and the War on Poverty created
a culture of entitlement and undercut individual responsibility. We exported that failed social philosophy
to Afghanistan. 91

Indeed, West is harshly dismissive of nation-building and the military's role in it:
For 10 years, in Afghanistan, our new COIN doctrine
has focused upon building a nation, and has not been
successful. The COIN doctrine says our troops are
expected to be nation-builders as well as warriors. I
believe that is deeply flawed. Our military, despite
the exhortations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
should not be a Peace Corps.92

West's view, albeit undiplomatically stated, seems
to be consistent with the majority of Americans who
now consider the war in Afghanistan as something
the United States should "not be involved in."93 This
writer has long believed that the armed forces should
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focus on the all-important task of warfighting, and
avoid a variety of deleterious effects that can arise
when the military becomes enmeshed in nation-building and related tasks, as part of a WoG approach or
otherwise. 94
Still, none of this is to say that a WoG approach is,
per se, flawed. It ought to always be considered when
addressing the multifaceted security issues of the 21st
century. Again, filtering its utility through the smart
power lens will likely find many opportunities where
it can be profitably employed. It is the overly-mechanistic application of the concept of a WoG approach
that can be the source of mischief and misdirection.
In the end, there is no substitute for wise contemplation of which situations can profit from a WoG approach, and which are most optimally addressed by
another, single-entity tool. Such measured analysis of
specific situations will ensure that the WoG approach
methodology maintains substantive vitality and does
not devolve into another exercise of empty pseudostrategy. In that way, it can be a whole lot of substance,
and not simply a whole lot of rhetoric.
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